Abstract. Students of regionalism almost reflexively include North America in their lists of regions in contemporary global politics.
Introduction
Announcing his candidacy for the presidency in November 1979, Ronald Reagan articulated a vision for what he termed a 'North American Accord' between Canada, the United States and Mexico, promising that he would 'work toward the goal of using the assets of this continent ... for the common good of all its people'. He acknowledged that such a process 'may take the next 100 years', but we can dare to dream that at some future date a map of the world might show the North American continent as one in which the people's commerce of its three strong countries flow more freely across their present borders than they do today. 1 Although Reagan was prompted to abandon his idea as a result of negative reaction in both Canada and Mexico, in the end it did not take 100 years for 'the people's commerce' to flow more freely in North America. Within six years, Canada's ·o -------------·-··-·· -· -. ~~~~.-.. prime minister, Brian Mulroney, would approach the US to launch negotiations for a free trade agreement; within a decade, the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) would be in force, Mulroney's Progressive Conservative party having fought the 1988 election mainly on the free trade issue. The CUSFTA provided a template for the initiation of free trade talks between Mexico and the US in June 1990, which were subsequently trilateralised to include Canada in February 1991. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), designed to liberalise trade and investment flows, was signed in December 1992 and came into force on 1 January 1994-just fourteen years after Reagan's speech.
NAFTA, bringing together two highly developed industrialised economies and a developing country, had a transformative impact on the North American economy. In the decade after 1994, intraregional transactions grew by over 80 per cent; exports and imports between the NAFT A signatories nearly doubled; investment flows more than doubled; more than 20 million new jobs were created. 2 To be sure, assessments of NAFTA's effects invariably point to the uneven nature of the economic benefits created, to the negative impacts of the agreement on some sectors and groups, and even to the contested causality of the economic changes observed. 3 But most economists would probably agree with Clemente Ruiz Duran that, considered from a purely economic perspective, NAFTA was 'the most successful trade agreement in the global economy'. 4 Certainly NAFTA deepened the continentalisation that had developed over the twentieth century between the US and its neighbours. As a Council of Foreign Relations report noted in 2005, NAFTA created a 'North American economic space' by making 'the outlines of a North American economy visible'.s And yet North America presents students of regionalism with a puzzle. On the one hand, NAFTA has clearly fostered the intensification of regionalisation, the process of economic integration that is driven from the bottom up by private actors such as firms in response to the opportunities created by the liberalisation of investment and trade. On the other hand, NAFT A has not led to greater regionalism, that is, state-led efforts to deepen regional integration through the fostering of other formal mechanisms to support institutionalised cooperation and collective action. 6 Even as state-led efforts to promote regionalism gathered momentum elsewhere-most notably in East Asia 7 -North American regionalism has barely deepened since the implementation of NAFT A.
This puts the North American case seriously at odds with neo-functionalist theories of regionalism. Popularised in the 1950s with the emergence of integration in western Europe, neo-functionalism argued that economic integration through regional trade agreements inevitably produces spill-over effects into other policy domains, and creates pressures for political integration more generally. 8 Neofunctionalism enjoyed a renaissance in the 1980s and 1990s, not just as a result of the establishment of the European Union with its supranational institutions, but also because of the appearance of new regional trade agreements in East Asia, Southern Africa, and in South and North America.
Apart from the EU project itself, NAFT A was considered to be the deepest and most integrative of these regional schemes. As Sidney Weintraub observed, despite the words 'free trade' in its name, it is much more than a trade agreement. NAFTA is intended to encompass an array of economic relations beyond trade in goods and services, such as investment, transportation, communications, border relations, environmental and labor matters, just to name a few. Stated more provocatively, NAFT A has the potential to alter political relations among the three countries ... 9 Indeed, given NAFTA's breadth of coverage, neo-functionalism would have predicted that the agreement would have generated spillovers into other areas such as monetary cooperation, the harmonisation of social policy, and, ultimately, political integration.
However, nothing of the sort has occurred. While NAFT A has been institutionalised,10 it has not developed deeper institutions of governance, 11 and has not 'progressed' into deeper cooperative arrangements in other policy domains. 12 Moreover, despite elite-driven efforts to deepen NAFTA and to construct notions of a regional community, a North American 'imaginary' has not emerged. Rather, the opposite has occurred: we have seen the 're-borderisation' of the US in the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001, the deflection by governments of elite proposals for the deepening ofNAFTA, and a resurgence of nationalism and parochialism that has precluded the growth of a North American 'community' or 'identity'.
Our purpose is to explore the contradictions of regionalism in North America and to explain why North Americans have been so open to regionalisation but so resistant to regionalism. First, we examine the dynamics which led to NAFTA, noting that in contrast to regional integration projects that were occurring elsewhere, NAFT A was not driven by a desire to strengthen regionalism per se. Rather, NAFTA originated in what Robert Pastor has characterised as the 'dual-bilateralism' 13 of North American international relations-that is, where the dominant patterns of interaction are on US-Canada and US-Mexico bilateral axes. Part two explores the aftermath of 9/11, which disrupted the openness of American borders, and propelled business elites to advance proposals for the deeper economic integration. We argue that these proposals, which borrow from the European 'template' for regional integration, are premised on out-dated notions that see regionalism as economically determined rather than socially constructed. The third part explores governmental and civil society responses to these elite-driven proposals, demonstrating the degree to which elites have not been able to convince either government officials or civil society actors of their vision for a regional community. Finally, we examine the role of the US in North American regionalism and ask whether regionalism is possible when it would necessarily involve curbs on American autonomy and sovereignty. While this would seem an obvious question, surprisingly it is not one that has been widely canvassed in the literature on North American 'regionalism'. We conclude by noting that the contradictions of regionalism in North America render unlikely the prospects for the development of a North American community.
NAFTA: from 'dual-bilateralism' to trilateralism?
Although its name implies a regional project, NAFTA's original purpose was not to strengthen North American regionalism, or even to encourage regional integration. Rather, the origins ofNAFTA are to be found in essentially national calculations: in Canada and Mexico, calculations about their respective bilateral relationships with the US, and in the US, calculations about managing bilateral relations with its two neighbours. While NAFTA may look trilateral, its genesis was not.
Ironically, NAFTA's origins can in part be traced to the rejection in Canada of Reagan's North American Accord, manifested most clearly in the election of the Liberals under Pierre Elliott Trudeau in February 1980. Trudeau embraced a set of overtly economic nationalist policies: the National Energy Program, designed to promote self-sufficiency in energy and insulate Canadian industry from volatility in global energy prices, and a revitalised role for the Foreign Investment Review Agency in promoting indigenous ownership. These initiatives, which had a negative impact on American business interests in Canada, were embraced just as Ronald Reagan was elected and Congress was starting to respond to a steep decline in US trade performance with harsh protectionist measures, causing a major deterioration in Canada-US relations.I 4 This conjuncture posed a serious structural problem for Canadians. After the Second World War, there had been considerable integration between Canada and the US: air defence had been continentalised by the North American Air Defence CUSFTA represented a radical shift in Canadian politics; in Brian Tomlin's apt phrase, by embracing free trade with the US, Canadians were 'leaving the past behind'. 18 For indeed 'the past' had weighed heavily since the Liberals under Wilfrid Laurier went down to defeat in the 1911 election on the issue of free trade with the US. That election cast a long shadow, helping to entrench as an axiom of Canadian politics that free trade was tantamount to electoral suicide. 19 But if the 1988 election results suggested that mass opinion in Canada had shifted, so too had elite opinion changed. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the business community, which thrived on high tariff walls, had generally been strongly opposed to free trade; indeed, business had taken the lead in. both 1891 and 1911 elections to oppose the free trade option that was an issue in both those elections. 20 But by the mid-1970s, faced with a changed economic environment, the business community began to shift its view, becoming ardent and vocal advocates for free trade with the US.2t But neither elites nor the public in Canada saw the CUSFT A as a harbinger of some larger regional project. On the contrary: the discourse around free trade focused on the nation and its future, with those opposed to the agreement arguing that free trade would see Canada increasingly absorbed into the US, and those favouring free trade arguing that the agreement would increase Canada's wealth and autonomy.
In the US, the agreement was likewise seen in strictly bilateral terms, as a manifestation of the American preference for what Lipsey and Wonnacott call the 'hub-and-spoke' approach to trade. 22 And while the advantages for American economic interests in embracing comprehensive free trade were recognised, there was no sense that the CUSFT A was the first step towards a trilateral free trade agreement, much less a regional community. Rather, from an American perspective, the agreement was soon seen as a useful template that could be used effectively for a bilateral agreement with Mexico.
For the year after the CUSFTA came into force, Mexico asked the US to negotiate a free trade agreement. Like Canada, Mexico had experienced increasing cross-border economic integration since the 1960s, mainly in the form of migration, both legal and unauthorised, to the US to fill labour shortages, but also as a result of the success of the 1965 Border Industrialization Program that boosted employment in the maquiladora industries. 23 Like Canada, Mexico had a high level of dependence on trade with the US: by 1994, 78 per cent of exports were going to and 68 per cent of imports were coming from the US. 24 But, as Carol Wise notes, following the economic disruptions of the 1970s, both Canada and Mexico 'had begun a gradual process of economic liberalization and macroeconomic restructuring to address the cumulative shortcomings of decades of high protectionism'. 25 In Canada, the process was intensified by the combined impact of recession and increasing American protectionism; in Mexico, it was sparked by the 1982 debt crisis. Mexico embarked on a process of commercialliberalisation. 26 Like Canada, Mexico needed secure access to the US market to secure its goals. And, like Mulroney, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who had in 1988 declared that a free trade arrangement would not be in Mexico's interests, 27 also changed his mind: on 10 August 1990, Mexico formally asked the US to start free trade negotiations.
For the US, the idea of replicating with Mexico the same kind of agreement concluded with Canada had a particular appeal. Not only would comprehensive free trade bring the benefits that economic theory posited, but increasing Mexican wealth could solve a persistent problem in the Mexican-American bilateral relationship: large-scale illegal migration. 28 The calculation was simple: if Mexicans grew wealthier as a result of free trade, fewer of them would seek to migrate to the US. 29 The Mexican-American free-trade negotiations concerned Canada, for the successful negotiation of a US-Mexican FTA 'jeopardized Canada's privileged status in terms of its institutionalization of its special relationship with the United States'. 30 The Canadians asked that the bilateral talks be transformed into a trilateral negotiation. 3 ' The way in which the negotiations became trilateralised speaks volumes about the nature of the agreement, and why Pastor would characterise NAFTA as dualbilateralism rather than trilateralism. For, in the end, NAFTA was not truly trilateral; rather it was an agreement between two small economies seeking, with comparable levels of desperation, secure access to an increasingly protectionist American market, and a superpower, which had its own reasons for agreeing to a common agreement with its neighbours. Nor was it a prelude to a deeper regionalism. On the contrary: as Gordon Mace put it succinctly, 'the signatories ofNAFTA never intended that this more modest achievement could be transformed into something else'. 32 The lack of interest in region-building among the NAFTA parties stands in striking contrast to the regionalism evident in both Europe and Asia. The regionalist project in Europe, born in the aftermath of the Second World War, was driven by a shared desire to avoid future wars between France and Germany, and to re-establish European power in the world. To be sure, the development of regionalism proceeded in fits and starts, due to the periodic resurgence of nationalist interests and identities. However, a number of internal pressures in the early 1980s led to the re-launch of the European project. In particular, the problem of 'Eurosclerosis', and the need to improve Europe's economic competitiveness in a rapidly globalising economy, generated widespread political support for the establishment of the Single European Market. And the establishment of a common currency and the monetary union was 27 Maxwell A. Cameron and Brian W. Tomlin driven by another important internal dynamic, namely France's determination to stymie the financial primacy of West Germany and the Bundesbank. 33 These developments led to the full institutionalisation of regionalism in Western Europe: the removal of domestic barriers to the free movement of capital, goods, services and labour among the member states of the European Union; the establishment of supranational institutions for collective decision-making to support the common market; and a commitment to the development of policies aimed at reducing imbalances and disparities within the region. None of these drivers for regionalism was evident in North America. NAFTA was not conceived in an environment of deep-seated conflict and hostility, nor did its architects frame it as a 'regionalist' response to the emergence of the external economic pressures (such as the creation of the other regionalist blocs, most notably the EU). Nor has the asymmetry of power relations between Canada and Mexico on the one hand and the US on the other produced a dynamic similar to the one that led to the establishment of the euro, whereby the establishment of a common currency and a monetary union was seen as a way of restraining the dominance of the major economic power in the region.
Regionalism in East Asia presents another contrast to North America. There we have seen strong market-led regionalisation in the form of extensive intra-regional trade and investment flows and the establishment of regional production networks by multinational corporations. This occurred largely in the absence of region-wide institutions to provide a supportive framework for this activity, and there has been very little evidence of the sort of internal 'spillovers' that would generate pressures for greater integration, as theorised by neo-functionalists. By contrast, external pressures have had a catalytic effect on the development of both regional identity and regional institutions. In particular, the East Asian financial crises of 1997-98 contributed to region-building in two important ways. First, the crises contributed to a deepening sense of shared 'East Asian' identity, spurred in large part by ill-feelings towards Anglo-American style capitalism in general and the International Monetary Fund in particular. 34 The crises also prompted the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to work closely together with China, Japan and South Korea-in the so-called ASEAN Plus Three grouping-to establish a regional mechanism to respond to future crises. 35 While John Ravenhill, in his contribution to this collection, suggests that regional arrangements in East Asia are primarily symbolic rather than substantial, the important point to note is that there is a strong discourse of regionalism in East Asia that is altogether absent in the North American case.
In the East Asian and European cases, regionalism has been driven by different imperatives, and has taken different institutional forms. But in both cases, governments have demonstrated a willingness to negotiate, adopt and implement common policies to strengthen, support and deepen regionalism as a project-in the case of the EU in terms of concrete outcomes and in the case of East Asia in terms of a strong regionalist discourse and preference for regional institution-building. By contrast, we have seen very little evidence of either practical outcomes that strengthen regionalism nor a regionalist discourse in North America.
Desperately seeking deepening: North America's elite-driven regionalism Although NAFT A started life as a free trade agreement-and was expected by its framers to remain nothing more than that-the functionalist dynamic first identified in 1961 by Bela Balassa can be seen in the North American case. Balassa's model of economic integration for Western Europe started with a free trade area, then progressively moved to a customs union, followed by a common market, an economic union that involves some harmonisation of national economic policies, and then finally to complete economic integration that unified monetary, fiscal and social policies. 36 In keeping with functionalist theory, Belassa argued that each stage would generate pressures that could only be solved by moving to the next stage. Some of those pressures emerged in NAFTA's first decade, resulting in some attempts to push deeper North American integration and move to the next stage.
In Canada, for example, there was a short-lived debate in 1999 over proposals a North American Monetary Union, including a new common currency, dubbed the ameroY The euro had just been introduced in Europe and the Canadian dollar was trading at an all-time low of 68 US cents, and a monetary union was seen as a means of resolving some of the instability and uncertainty associated with exchange rates. 38 In the US, Robert Pastor was the leading advocate of turning NAFT A into something more than a free trade area. A professor at Emory University who had served as the advisor to a bipartisan commission devoted to educating Americans about NAFTA, Pastor's call for greater regionalism in North America, including an endorsement of the amero, was published in August 2001. 39 In Mexico, regionalism was championed by the state. When Vicente Fox Quesada, the Partido Acci6n Nacional (PAN) candidate, won the presidency in 2000, he openly embraced the idea of transforming NAFT A. His '20/20 Vision' called for the creation within twenty years of a customs union, a common external tariff, coordinated monetary policies, and particularly the mobility of labour. 40 the
'deepening' and 'broadening' NAFT A, particularly the inclusion of labour mobility. 41 None of these integrative proposals gained much traction in the short term, however. Neither the Canadian government nor the business community in Canada proved interested in the 1999 proposals for monetary union, and they sank from sight. 42 
The attacks of 9/11 radically shifted the debate about deepening North American integration. While Fox backed away from regionalism after 9/11, 43 key actors in all three countries began to push regionalism as a means of dealing with the economic impacts of 9/11. While the United States did not actually close the border on 11 September, the 'Alert Level One' that was declared demanded lengthy inspections at border crossings. The Canadian border was of particular concern after American newspapers reported that some of the 9/11 hijackers had slipped into the US from Canada and that Canada was a 'haven for terrorists'. 44 In the days after 9111 line-ups of trucks stretched for more than 30 kilometres down highways leading into the US, with reported cross-border waits of up to 10-12 hours. These delays caused millions of dollars in losses for companies that had become used to just-in-time supply chains. The automotive sector was hit particularly hard, with some plants remaining closed as a result of parts shortages caused by border delays, and estimated lost production of over 50,000 units industry-wide in the days after 9/11. 45 Importantly, the changes at the border were given more permanent bureaucratic expression over the longer term. Robert Bonner, Commissioner of the US Customs Service, noted that after 9/11, 'our priority mission ... changed from the interdiction of illegal drugs and the regulation of trade to a security prevention mission: preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the US.' 46 In October 2001, the number of customs and immigration officers along the US-:-Canadian border tripled. A mammoth bureaucracy, the Department of Homeland Security, was created and given the overarching task of making America impervious to attacks. 'if the movement of persons, vehicles, and goods across the border compromises US security, then the border arrangements will be altered in ways that will serve to guarantee homeland security'. 47 As the American ambassador in Ottawa, Paul Cellucci, reminded Canadians, in the post-9/11 world, 'security trumps trade' . 48 The Not surprisingly, the preferred proposed solutions advanced by academics, think tanks, and business groups fixed on assuaging American concerns about security. In Canada, Michael Hart and William Dymond, two former officials who had been involved in the CUSFT A negotiations, argued that border management after 9/11 was 'inadequate'; their 'new design for new circumstances' involved a 'deepening' of integration via a series of incremental moves that focused on 'shoring up US confidence' in Canada's ability to contribute to American security, the creation of a less bureaucratic border, and the establishment of 'a seamless market governed by a single set of rules'.5I
Five months later, Wendy Dobson, a professor of management at the University of Toronto and a former associate deputy minister in Canada's Department of Finance, proposed what she called the 'Big Idea' that was needed to capture the attention of an American government transfixed by threats to security. Her 'Big Idea' was not to push for a customs union or common market, but rather a 'strategic bargain' that would pragmatically try to deal with American security concerns in return for reducing the impediments to trade and the movement of people. Dobson allowed that the process of 'deepening' North American integration would establish 'some customs-union-and common-market-like arrangements', but she argued that this would 'achieve the benefits of a customs union or a common market ... without the harmonization that would undermine political independence'. 52
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott advocated a comparable step-by-step method. They acknowledged that integrative benchmarks such as free migration or legal harmonisation would not be achieved any time soon. 'Rather,' they concluded, 'we take a more pragmatic approach and target the reduction or elimination of specific barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital, and people ... ' 53 Other contributors to the debate rejected such limited visions. In the US, for example, a Brookings Institution conference in December 2001 featured Perrin Beatty, the president of the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters, Andres Rozental, the president ofthe Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales, and Robert Pastor unambiguously pressing the importance of creating a North American community. 54 Hugh Segal, the president of the Institute for Research on Public Policy, enthusiastically called for a wholesale embrace of an EU-style 'North American Community', including the creation of political institutions such as an elected 'North American Assembly'.5 5 Allan Gotlieb, a former deputy foreign minister and Canadian ambassador to the United States, may not have endorsed Segal's expansive vision, but he was critical of the limited and ad hoc nature of many of the proposals on offer:
To believe such issues can be addressed by lobbying or intermittent, patchwork arrangements is unrealistic in the extreme. The national interest requires a grand strategy, aimed at creation of a more comprehensive structure, a community of law, under which the free flow of goods and services and people can be guaranteed. Whether in the form of a common market, a customs union, a community of laws inspired by the European model, or some unique hybrid, such an agreement would entail the reduction and eventual abolition of all trade-remedy actions between our two countries, and their replacement, as in Europe, with a common competition policy.s6
The proposals for deeper integration as a means of resolving the security-trade dilemma were also being pushed in the political arena. a 're-invention' of North American borders to create 'a zone of cooperation encompassing the continent' that would allow North America to be 'open to business but closed to terrorism'; the harmonisation of regulatory frameworks; the negotiation of a resource security pact; the creation of a 'North American defence community of sovereign nations'; and the creation of 'specialized joint commissions' to implement these initiatives. 5 8 In April2003, the CCCE formed a 30-person 'Action Group' of CEOs from major corporations to push the integration agenda forward. This initiative was given added impetus when the Council on Foreign Relations launched a 'task force' in November 2004 to explore how to provide both security and prosperity. The task force was trinational-sponsored by the CFR, the CCCE, and the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales (COMEXI)-and chaired by John Manley, a former deputy prime minister and foreign affairs minister of Canada, Pedro Aspe, a former secretary of the Treasury of Mexico, and William Weld, a former governor of Massachusetts. Not only were the vice-chairs familiar names in the regionalist project-Thomas d' Aquino, Robert Pastor, and Andres Rozen talbut a number of task force members had also contributed to the debate. Not surprisingly, the final report reflected many of the ideas that had been circulating since 9/11.
Building a North American Community, published in May 2005, was a 32-page blueprint; although brief, its recommendations were both ambitious and comprehensive. They included the creation of a common security perimeter, the negotiation of common external tariffs on a sector-by-sector basis, and moves to create a common economic zone, including full labour mobility. Some of the recommendations focused on harmonisation, from border management to 'tested once' regimes for pharmaceuticals to trinational recognition of professional standards. Some focused on institution-building: a permanent tribunal for dispute resolution, a trinational competition commission, an institutionalised annual summit meeting of heads of government, a North American Advisory Council, a North American InterParliamentary Group. Specific proposals ranged from the adoption of a North American Border Pass, a North American Investment Fund to encourage investment in Mexico, the signing of a North American resource accord, and the creation of education initiatives comparable to programs in place in the EU. 59 Responses to deeper integration By the time that the CFR Task Force reported, the three governments had already responded with an initiative intended to address the regionalist ideas being bruited by business. Indeed, they even named it after the initiative launched in 2003 by the CCCE: the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP). According to Stephen Clarkson, 60 in November 2004 that he and the Canadian prime minister discussed a 'new partnership' for 'enhanced security, greater prosperity and improved quality of life.' 61 The initiative was announced by the three leaders at a summit at Waco, Texas, on 23 March 2005. The SPP created two 'agendas'. The security agenda focused on external and internal threats to North America, as well as finding ways to 'streamline the secure movement of low-risk traffic across our shared borders'. The 'prosperity agenda' sought to enhance productivity, reduce the costs of trade, and improve the quality of life. Ten working groups were charged with advancing the 'prosperity agenda' (unlike the security agenda, which was not organised into working groups). 62 Although the actual work of the SPP is conducted at the bureaucratic level, the three leaders review the work at an annual meeting, colloquially ( The SPP grants business special and privileged access to the three leaders. In March 2006 the corporate community established a trinational North American Competitiveness Council (NACC), a group of 30 companies, ten from each country, with a peak business association in each country serving as a national secretariat. At each summit, the NACC is given an opportunity to report to the leaders on ways to enhance the competitiveness of the North American economies. 63 While it might appear that there were similarities between the SPP and the various proposals for deeper North American integration discussed above, and while the SPP appears on the surface to be an example of North American regionalism, 64 it is in fact deeply ironic. Although its name was appropriated from a corporate initiative, it is clear that none of the governments involved in the SPP was keen to advance North American integration in the way that the corporate sector was proposing. Moreover, while Fox was enthusiastic about pressing North American regionalism-unlike Bush, Martin, or Harper-the arrival of Calderon in Los Pinos meant that as of 2007, all three of the 'amigos' had precisely the same enthusiasm for regionalist projects, which is to say virtually none at all.
On the contrary: the SPP involved a neat sleight of hand: it appeared to create the integrative arrangements that were being pressed by the corporate, academic and think tank communities, and it certainly did create privileged access to the corporate community that was denied to other civil society groups. But in substance, there was little trilateral space created by the SPP; instead dual-bilateralism continued to reign. Indeed, Roland Paris, one of the bureaucrats who worked on the creation of the SPP, argued that the initiative turned into a way to organise and mobilise bureaucratic action on a large number of existing policy dossiers on highly technical policy matters. He dismissed the SPP as nothing more than a 'hodgepodge of bilateral and trilateral working groups' that did little more than generate 'grocery lists' that lacked 'any organizing vision or direction'. 65 Certainly the highly technical bureaucratic work reported on the official websites 66 suggests that Paris's biting description of the SPP as consisting largely of 'mind-numbing lists of mostly piddling initiatives' is not unwarranted.
But the second irony of the SPP is that its creation had exactly the opposite political impact than the one intended by its enthusiasts. Recent work by students of regionalism recognises the degree to which regions are 'imagined' or 'socially constructed', and not just economically determined. 67 As Wendy Lamer and William Walters remind us, regions 'are not inevitable expressions of geography, but are "imagined communities" produced by region-building elites', and that therefore we should pay 'greater attention ... to the "inventedness" ofregions'. 68 Likewise, recent scholarship on regionalism alerts us to the importance of identity and values in shaping enthusiasm for, or resistance to, regionalist projects. And we can see that the advocacy by the business community of an explicitly regionalist solution for North America, even if it had uniquely North American characteristics, and the apparent endorsement of that project by the three governments of North America by their embrace of the SPP, triggered significant resistance among civil society actors that, we will argue, has actually served to dampen the growth of regionalism in North America since the launch of the SPP.
In all three countries, the SPP was greeted by many critics as heralding a new political project designed to eliminate the existing nation-states of North America and to create a supranational entity comparable to the EU. In Canada and Mexico, the SPP was opposed by mainly by civil society organisations on the left, such as the Council of Canadians, Common Frontiers, Green Party of Canada, Reseau quebecois sur I' integration continentale, the Red Mexicana de Acci6n Frente al Libro Commercio and the Dialogo Nacional por la Defensa de la Soberania. Joined by some American CSOs, such as the Alliance for Responsible Trade and the Citizens' Trade Campaign, these trinational networks had coalesced around the free trade debates of the early 1990s and the anti-globalisation protests of the late 1990s and early 2000s; after the inauguration of the SPP, these networks mobilised to oppose what they characterised as the undemocratic nature of efforts at greater economic and political integration such as the SPP, focusing on Web activism and street protests. 69 Opposition also came from the right, but was concentrated primarily in the US. The American right fixed on a single concern: that the SPP was the first step in a 'secret' plan by government and corporate 'elites' to merge the US with Canada and Mexico and create a North American Union. The clearest evidence for this, it was claimed, was the plan to construct a 'NAFTA Superhighway', a giant multi-modal highway system linking Mexico, the US, and Canada. This highway would have ten lanes of car/truck traffic; the median would be used for railways and oil, gas and water pipelines. The main superhighway was going to run from Manzaniiio and Lazaro Cardenas, up through San Antonio and Kansas City, where it would branch northwest to Omaha, Winnipeg and Alberta, and northeast to Chicago, Detroit, Toronto and Montreal. This highway was going to be of enormous proportions: descriptions routinely put it as the width of four football fields-that is, nearly 400 metres/1200 feet wide-thus requiring not only vast expenditures, but vast expropriations of land across the midwestern US. More disturbingly still in the minds of opponents, it was going to be an international highway, where American law would not prevail, meaning that unregulated and unsafe Mexican trucks could come into the US carrying drugs, smuggled humans and terrorists, and crash into unsuspecting Americans who would be powerless to collect insurance. 70 Opposition to the North American Union and the NAFTA Superhighway was galvanised largely on the Web, particularly through postings to Y ouTube. Large numbers of conservative organisations were involved in the anti-SPP movement, including national groups like Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum and other civil society organisations on the right, such as the Minutemen and the John Birch Society. The on-line versions of conservative publications, such as The American Conservative, Human Events, and WorldNetDaily were also important in producing-and reproducing-the message. Typically, postings by peak groups or key individuals in the movement were copied verbatim and reposted to a vast number of sites and blogs. 71 But opposition to both the NAU and the NAFTA Superhighway was also legitimised by mainstream figures as varied as CNN's Lou Dobbs, conservative commentator Patrick Buchanan, presidential candidate Ron Paul, union president James Hoffa, and numerous politicians at both the state and federal level who treated the concerns being expressed seriously.7 2 The irony of the SPP debate in the US is that the robust opposition to the initiative was based on a conspiracy theory. Although the SPP comes nowhere close to creating the conditions for a North American Union, parts of the SPP can easily be (re)constructed to make it appear as though there is a secret plan by the president to ignore the constitution and dismantle the US. Likewise, the NAFTA Superhighway was (and is) entirely mythical. multi-modal transportation corridors in the middle of the continent. However, the map originally marketing their idea showed a stylised set of roads and railways that was (purposely) completely out of proportion. 74 But this map was widely copied to thousands of websites, stirring numerous Americans into political action against this putative threat.
It is a useful reminder of just how unusual American politics is that a conspiracy theory would gain the considerable political traction it did.7 5 The NAU and the NAFT A Superhighway became mainstream issues, to be raised with presidents during press conferences as serious matters (as Bret Baier, FOX News's White House correspondent, did at a press conference in August 200776). Likewise, politicians at both the federal and state levels took the issue seriously enough to register their views, even if only symbolically. But it is indicative that as of April 2008, resolutions expressing opposition to the North American Union and the NAFTA Superhighway had been introduced in the legislatures of almost half the states in the union, and that 44 members of the House of Representatives from twenty-two states had agreed to co-sponsor a concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that 'the United States should not engage in the construction of a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A) Superhighway System' for fear, inter alia, that 'unrestricted' trucking would be 'a conduit for the entry into the United States of illegal drugs, illegal human smuggling, and terrorist activities'. 77 For its part, the White House felt compelled to post a 'fact sheet' on its SSP website seeking to debunk the myths 78 (even though for committed conspiracy theorists denial is merely confirmation of the existence of the conspiracy). Finally, we should not ignore the impact of the SPP debate on the electoral campaigns of candidates for the Democratic nomination in 2008: both Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama did not hesitate to criticise NAFTA during the primaries for its negative impact on manufacturing jobs in the US.7 9 The reactions to the Security and Prosperity Partnerships of civil society groups from both the left and the right demonstrate the difficulty of embracing regionalism in a North American context. To be sure, much of the opposition to the SPP reflected a deep concern, particularly in those parts of the US hard hit by the migration of manufacturing, about job losses. But there can be little doubt that Americans, Canadians and Mexicans, when confronted with projects that can be constructed as regionalist, such as NAFTA or the SPP, tend to have a very different reaction than Europeans. As Frank Graves has shown, in Europe we have seen a long secular decline in national attachments, but a secular increase in local identities, and a dramatic rise in European identity. In North America, by contrast, he shows that there has been a decline in local identity and a dramatic increase in national attachment-but that identification with 'North America' continues to be relatively low. so To a consideration of how the particular conditions of North America limit the growth of the regional identity that would be necessary for the growth of regionalism we now turn.
The US and regionalism
In the previous section, we explained why the governments of Canada, Mexico and the US responded so cautiously to various business proposals for the deepening of the regionalism in North America. In this section, we question whether regionalismthat is, state-led efforts to deepen regional integration through the fostering of formal mechanisms to support institutionalised cooperation and collective action-is a viable political option for the US given its structural power and preferences.
Any deepening of economic integration along the lines advocated by the proponents of a North American community would necessarily require the strengthening of regional institutions to provide a framework for deepened cooperation in policy and governance. But, given the nature of US structural power in the regional and global economy, to what extent would it be willing to participate in joint decision-making processes through strengthened regional institutions? There are several ways of answering that question.
First, we have observed that NAFTA is better understood as 'dual bilateralism' between the US and two 'spokes' rather than as a trilateral or regional agreement. At no time has any US administration demonstrated any interest in pursuing deeper forms of North American regional integration that would vest any significant policy-making authority in an intergovernmental institution, much less a supranational one. This was very much evident in the deliberate weakness of the institutions that are meant to support NAFTA. The NAFTA Secretariat does not exist as a sole authority but is constituted by three national Sections offices, which are 'mirror images' of each other. 81 There is also a Commission for Labor Cooperation and a Commission for Environmental Cooperation. However, these were designed to ensure the least disruption to national policies and governance; like the NAFTA Secretariat itself, they have minimal mandates, meagre funding and little influence. 82 In that sense, they reflect the strong US preference to maintain its policy autonomy, not just in the conduct of its foreign economic relations but also in the conduct of its domestic economic policies.
·To be sure, no serious advocate of deepening North American integration advocates an EU-style approach that involves the establishment of supranational institutions and the pooling of sovereignty, for such a proposal would be anathema to all three NAFTA governments. 83 But even if the Canadian and Mexican governments were to arrive at the view that it was desirable to establish robust regional institutions for collective decision-making, it is difficult to imagine the US being receptive to any institutional or inter-governmental arrangement where its authority and interests did not predominate. For as Isabel Studer notes, the most significant political impediments to deepening regionalism in North America 'exist in the United States, where deeply engrained biases against the creation of supranational institutions prevail, particularly in Congress.' 84 Indeed, the history of US involvement in multilateral institutions suggests that the US jealously guards its national sovereignty and unless it can dominate the decision-making processes of such intergovernmental institutions, it is generally reluctant to participate in them or to have its freedom of action in any way restrained. This is not a recent development or reflective of the unilateralism of the George W. Bush era. For instance, sovereignty concerns were central to the decision of the administration of Harry S. Truman not to submit the Charter of the International Trade Organization to the Senate in 1950, whereas the predominance of US power in the other Bretton Woods institutions-the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development-meant that these passed without controversy. Likewise, even during the heyday of multilateralism, some uncontroversial treaties that were supported by the White House were not ratified by Congress due to concerns about their impact on US sovereignty (for example, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity).
In short, Congressional politics reflects and reproduces the concerns expressed by CSOs and state legislators about the threat-real and imagined-to US sovereignty posed by proposals for the deepening of regional integration in North America. In that sense, opposition to the 'regional project' is not just about reluctant civil societies; more importantly, it reflects a much longer trajectory of US political preferences and the reluctance of the hegemon to be bound by intergovernmental agreements where its interests did not predominate, or where its sovereignty was in any way eroded. As Andrew Hurrell notes, 'The explicit preference of the United States has been to avoid any institutional framework that would allow for the internal development of integration and that might constrain its legal and political autonomy .. .'. 85 Indeed, the US -like other great powers-shows very few tendencies towards becoming a 'post-sovereign' polity. After 9/11, the heavy re-borderisation of America and the re-assertion of the national security state demonstrate the degree to which the US-and vast numbers of Americans-remain deeply attached to the Westphalian paradigm.
The implications for regionalism in North America are obvious. US structural power, together with its sovereignty concerns, will mean that regional decisionmaking in important policy domains is unlikely to be joint, consensual and Certainly there is not much 'doing' occurring on the part of governments to advance regionalism in North America, as evident in the superficiality of the SPP initiative. Moreover, as we have argued, the response by civil society actors in all three countries to proposals to deepen regionalism has been one of suspicion, resistance and downright hostility, invoking, in turn, political responses that denigrate the.regionalism project.
To be sure, the processes of regionalisation will continue to push efforts by the NAFT A members to address issues of common concern, especially in matters of economic and commercial policy. But as we have observed, there are significant political, social and structural dynamics at work which are certain to impede the emergence of North American regionalism, making the prospects for the development of a North American community as dim today as they were when Reagan first bruited the idea of a North American Accord in 1979. 
